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7. Modern Totalitarianism: Russian Communism 
SQiaja-PjQLll,ti.£al_._analysts place fascism at the extreme right 
9L . ical.,„3B^e ,, CommunisiTj^^ extreme 
le^. This classification has been much favore*<rT5y~i9ai:Ttis^r 
writers who believe that fascism is the laat r]ea|;)nrat.F! .gffn-rt 
enibattled..j;aj3ijLaJLisiiLJ:-Q_,ata off the proletarian victory. 
Doubtless, Cosiia«iiisi-.writers are aware of the"vaTue in come 
circles of the lef tist label with its overtones nf prnf^r^fjs.g;, 
welfare^ We have already noted the 
origin of the terus "Left" and "Right" in the French Revolution 
when they were used to distinguish between the advocates of 
change and the more conservative. Survival of these labels into 
a later age with vastly different problems and proposals has 
not helped clarify political thinking. It may already have 
occurred to the thoui^tJuL-xaajder. that t^classify Ilazismas a 
near relative ofconservatism creates as many difficulties as 
&QjLKjas-« iDxmxlar di,fficultxeaBTa^iiic^ation of Rusr 
sian Communism as a party of the Left. . 
* Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Hough-
ton Llifflin Company, 1943) , pp. 327, 284-285, 294, 297, 300-301, 
623, S5, 3G2, 82, 91, 210-211, 212, 107, 351, 380, 381, 343, 171, 
150, 446, 180-181, 242, 407-408, 645-646. Used with permission.^ 
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In the vast amount of contemporary literature about modern 
Russia that has appeared in the non-Communist world, three ap-
proai3hes stand out. _ Th<^ through Marxism and the ex­
egesis nf T.onin q f h p - r  gotmrnrrri gr It  focUSeS 
o n -^e ro 1 _e_. o t hi s ide ology:-ln- shapl ng-._-t he ins t i tut ions and 
actions of The second treats Communism'as an ex­
ample, along with fascism, of a soc"ialT~intellectual.  and po-
ITtTcal~mo^ment peculiar to this century: totaiitarianism. 
In this interpretation the political spectrum is not a sibraight 
l ine but a circle, with the ends meeting. The t^hird approach 
mgj^e laJjeled. the, Mstorical__.b-ecause it emphasizes tJialxm^rt-
ajic^of specifically Ru5siaii^.actC!XS„,,.Qj t ime and place, both 
long-range and iinniedii.t©-. In this view id^eology is signific-
aht primarily as a rationalization of a situation which is less 
lomtnuniat than Russian. " " ^ 
In a preceding chapter the story of Bolshevism was carried 
" P  to Wozld-ZaiLJU- which proved to be the I i n d m  n g -  o f  _ t . a a y ^ 1 n m .  
The first flush of wartime patriotism soon wore off as, for 
three years, the giant but poorly equipped Russian armies threw 
themselves against the Central Powers, only to be driven back 
each time. One estimate places Russia's war casualties in the 
neighborhood of nine million. For the front-line troops the 
burden of humiliating defeat and crushing casualties was height­
ened by the knowledge that all  was not well on the home front. 
yonrJRusslaa • jgjereuJL in 1 ovaJ-tsL-QX , 
downright host 11 e, -tjQt,-,i;jia^.xegijae--whlch- ,had..-a.t . temp.te,d,,tp Russify 
them^ The econom:g. still  in the early stages of industrializa-
could iioT"^and the strain of modern warfare. Breakdowns 
in the transportactionstem^^ sed shortage, and even famine. 
pe.asajjt. That this unrest iwas endemic may seem~odd since b^"' 
1917 approximately eighty per cent of the arable land of Russia 
was peasant-owned, but these statistics tell  only part of the 
story. Land was buted v e r y  unevenly among-
many of whom simply did not have enough to live on. All e y e d  
hu^lgrlly the land owned by the nobility and t h e  Churnhj l a n d  
which the peasants b e l i e v e d  right! v t b e i r p ; -  "We are t h e  tsar*a^ 
btrt the l a n d  •!« ^nrw," r a n  +hG>ir- r » 1  r t  g a y i  n c r  M O S t  O f  the land 
listed above as peasant-owned was owniad,-Jiat-liy-.XMl3djiuja.ls. but 
by village communities, run inefficiently in a way reminiscent 
of the medieval manor in the West. Whether freeholders or mem­
bers of such a community, peasants were second-class citizens, 
subject to special oppressive laws and a bureaucracy that was 
corrupt and Inefficient.  
Tliese and other .deficiencies of wartime Russia v/ould have 
been more bear.ahle-y perhaps even surmountaliXe", rf"~tKereriiiLd-^^ 
effective leadership at the center oX the regime. The roval 
family was shnt ^.-Pf fyr»n -t-y-i placing their tj;'ust_JUi--«OTTirt 
favorites who were either adventurers or religious jfanatics. 
Thft T Q A R  • 1 R>Q-«- WI-Hh +VIQ ^ whose efficiency and 
prestige suffered accordingly. The emancipation of thA w^yf-ci 
(1861) had accelerated the decline of^£he_i^bl11ty. yoluntary 
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efforts to organize relief activities were hampered by offi-
cials fearful of subversion. Tho Duma, Russia's adolescent 
parliament, was allQweii no influence in the government. 
For those who would hear, there wero voices of protest 
aplenty. By virtue of restrictive electoral laws, the Duma was 
jaot Representative of POPU1ar sentiment but the majority of its 
melffiers, conser^ as welT as^l called for a con­
stitutional monarchy with a responsible ministry. The loosely 
knit Social Re:s;j3.IiitiQnjLrxeg->-(the S. R.'s) advocated rather vague 
programs which boiled down to agrarian anarchy. With their cry 
of "Land for the peasants," this uniguelv^Russian party most 
closely reflected the demands of thB^coiihtryside. The Me;^she-
vyc§ (moderate Social Democrats) put forward the, standard pro­
gram of socialism. 
IJ} this welter of protests and programs the other branch 
of Soci^ Democracy. "lS5e Bolsneviks, did not stand out. From 
his exile in Switzerland, Lenin rah the party with an i-rnn . 
although factional disputes~~Wer'e numerous. His doctrinal in-
transfgence and tactical skill prevented reunion with the Men-
sheviks whose relative moderation he condemned as counterrevo­
lutionary. Always flexible, he did permit collaboration with 
them in elections to the Duma, but he kept his own organization 
intact. Some—his- party's funds came from "expropriations" 
(bank robberies) , in which a key figure was a young:_fie,o.r£iarL. 
revolutionary J, Josef DzhMgashvili, better known by his party 
i^amesj Koba, and^ 1^ .(1879-1953) . Upon the outbreak 
of "World War "T, Lenin opposed uncompromisingly what he con­
tended was a capitalist trick to divert the attention of the 
working class from its mission: "The only correct proletarian 
slogan is the transformation of the present Imperialist war 
into a civil war...[and] the lesser evil for the Russian 
Social Democrats would be the defeat of the tsarist monarchy." 
Consequently the government ""HFove undergrbund tfie^artv. ^ bv. 
f^eiTredticed to Gpme~^'^ members, JThis disciplined 
m 1 nority did its best to sabotage the v/ar effort .  Soldier^ ~ 
we^re~l]5vfe^^o fraternize~~w 11h the enemy and desejci. Workers 
were encou^Fag^ed_jt,o„-,stafi4i€. ^Peasant unrest was fanned. PSow-
ever, when revolution cama-.„ it was not engineered by any group. 
Rather ,'~"it was a forrale^ outburst compounded of many griev­
ances and programs. 
The revolutionary year, 1917, opened with increasing 
strikes and general discontent. Tn fAhpia-i-v (March in the 
Western calendar, not Introduced in Russia until 1918), a local 
food crisis led to riots and demonstrations in Petrograd, the 
n e w  n a m e  f o r  S t .  P e t e r s b u r g .  U n c o m p r e h e n d i n g  t o  t h e  R n d j  t h e  
gDvefSjaent dissolved the Duma and ordered out troops. When t^ 
1 atr^^ miLtin 1 ed and- jolned. the demonstrators. the <;:anita1 was 
o^t of control. 
Into the vacuum stepped the Duma members who created a 
provisional government consist ing mainly of'moderate'liberals. 
Simultaneously, s^lf-appolnted deimdB^frkt6a'"s and mTs^llaneous 
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radicals set up a Soviet (Council) of Workers Deputies, which 
summoned the Russian people to reject tsardom. Whereupon, 
under pressure from both revolutionaries and his own advisers, 
Nicholas II abdicatedT" 
Tjie provisional government which for eight months tried to 
install in Russia a iai3^rr~g[gTih?cf^ic 
failure. BaseH at fxrst on tbe Duina, it failed tn comprehend 
popular" sejxtljaent. The chauvinism of many of its members led 
it to c^^ the war, with disastrous results. The troops 
simply deserted — "voted against war with their feet," in 
Lenin's phrase. Nor did the government understand the urgent 
njeed for economic reforms, particularly.. i tha ]/anH 'ayftirAyr-r-
Ever^here peasants were seizing land they wanted, but the gov­
ernment postponed taking action until a new constitution could 
be drawn up and reforms introduced in an orderly manner. Siace 
chaos had accompanied the breakdown of the old regime, prena-
rati6ris"y^~^^''c^^^ conven^Hon proceeded slowly, giving 
critics of the government addTn!onaT''"'aSm^^ 
Consequently, thp> {>:r»vprnmffn+ iTiir'nnnnri f-pnm all rfifAp-
^iJLQjasu.- In August it was able to beat off an attack by con-
servative-sponsored troops only by calling for help from the 
armed militia of the Soviet. The Petrograd Soviet, now in col­
laboration with similar bodies which had sprung up elsewhere, 
was actually a parallel government, sometimes giving its support 
to the nominal government and sometimes following an independent 
policy. Although all shades of radicalism were represented in 
i t s  r a n k s ,  b y  ^ ' ^ r + i 9 m b o r . J 3 r » i  g h o v i i r a  n , c + T r  
In sacuringL this. favored positian T.enin fniinwArf an oppor-
tujodstlc policy with only occasional setbacks. Taken unawares 
by the revolution, he had managed to return to Russia with the 
h e l p  o f  t h e  G e r m a n s ,  w h o  h o p e d  h e  w o u l d  f u r t h e r  w e a k e n  R u s s i a ' s  
war effort. Accurately gauging public sentiment, he endea 
to ident,party with the popular demand for '^eajcg^JUan^, 
Bread," A good example^ 6f™his pliability in"Tactics was his 
handling of the land question. Putting aside his own plans for 
its ultimate settlement, he gave every encouragement to the 
peasants to seize land. He tried to curb impatient radicals 
until the party was in a strong position, but when in July a 
group, including some Bolsheviks, staged a revolt in Petrograd, 
he ordered the party to participate so as to keep in the van­
guard of the revolution. For a time thereafter he was forced 
to go into hiding to escape arrest. 
^Thnnj whiln thr 1 -itg power to govexji. and. 
the other oppositiop parties diaHipated their Affr>vts! ija--nm±iia1 
recriminations, Lenin perfected his own nvfyani y.ation and tight-
ened his party's control at key,_iiQijaiLS-> In late autumn he~pef-
suaded hisfblTowers with some difficulty that it was time to 
strike. In October, Bolshevik-led troops and armed workers 
seized Petrograd go^rnment buildings. The next day^ an AILT 
Russian Congresig" 6'f""?rovi etSTj fronPwKTch moderate socialists 
ab^ented~themselves, handed over power to 
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Commissars, headed by Lenin_.and inr.lnrting Stalin as commissar 
ional minoritle^and. Leoii-^TrQ-taky (1874-1940) . presfgfent 
Qf the Petrogxad-Sevi^t, as commissar fpr foreign affa^^^ A 
land decree authorized peasants to seizV land f'or tHelr own use. 
Another decree turned over large factories to committees of 
workmen. Still another proclaimed the right of non-Russian 
nationalities to secede and establish their own governments, 
which was, in fact, already being done. An ominous portent of 
the future was the regime's establishment of an extraordinary 
political police forc^ the Cheka (later known as the OGPU, 
then the NKVD, and now the MVD). When fairly free elections to 
the long-promised constitutional convention gave 420 seats to 
the S. R.'s, as against only 225 to the Bolsheviks, Red troops 
cut short its sitting. After this most of those S. R.'s who 
had hitherto cooperated with the Bolsheviks were driven from 
positions of authority. 
Lenin recognized that the Bolsheviks needed nfiar.p. at. anv . 
prif fi ^Frr-?rr>n.c;r.J i riatA thfti T* pn.ciit|pn. Mnrftnvfir. since he be­
lieved that a general world revolution was just around the cor­
ner, he considered the actual terms of only secondary importance. 
They would soon have to be revised anyway. Consequently in the., 
spring of 1918 he algned a humillatiJigi .±re.aty rTerr^iany whir.h 
stl^pped Russia^f^a^band of territory along her^^.es,teXR-fe 
most^f the wes^rn acqulsrtTon¥3ICl£Qter....i;JbL^ 
cessorsZi The c^HTal was moved fPetrogr(soon to be re­
named Leningrad) to the .1,ess, 
Exclamation of a new government and of peace with rTftrmanv 
did not^brmg an'end to hostilities. The Rolsheviks had to 
Conquer the country .proyince by province. oftgji.joJLlaggj33i^^ 1-
lageCl lii the Caucasus and elsewhere non-Russian nationalities 
declared their Independence. Anti-Bolshevik White governments 
were established in a number of places. Eor vari^f^ vpapmn.q ^ 
Japan, France. Britain, and the United States sent money, mate-
rleT^^nd- txoops to the far north, south, and east. 
Despite local White victories, the ant-i-R«^i abPTy-i Tt 
in taj-Lmw. In~IXotsky the Red army found a military ad­
ministrator of real genius. Public opinion in tiie intervention-
11:51 powers^ some of it leftist, some merely antiwar, made itself 
felt. Just what intervention was to have accomplished was never 
clear anyway. The White governments, representing virtually 
every shade of anti-Bolshevik opposition, were incapable of co­
operation. To the Russian peasant they stood for the reimposl-
tion of a hated regime, and one tainted by foreign control at 
that. Consequently, hv }929. +Tip wair iWP'i nypr, '"i 
Caucasia and Transcaucasia, and the Ukraine reunited with Bol-
stievili: Russia. 
By the same date there was a halt 1 n the expans 1 on ojf_£^m-
munism Ijeyond the frontiers. CQmrnundTst parties --"the lab^ 
"Communist" was formally aHbpted by t^e "Bolsheviks in 1918 — 
were formed ih most^ counfrles7~6Tt'e^ 1 ving off from the 
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Socialist, parties. Their ac±±vtitxes were coordinated from 
Moscow throug-h the Comintern (Third or_Comm\inist Jn.ternatioqal ^  
gs"~gi^ingiiis^^ the Second or Socialist bodj) . Colonial 
peoples were urged to revolt. But the Bolshevik expectation 
that the collapse of the Central Powers would open the way to a 
mass uprising of the proletariat proved incorrect. Brief up­
risings there were with Bolshevik blessing and backing, for ex­
ample, in Germany and Hungary in 1919. During a Russo-Polish 
war over the borderlands in 1920-1921, a Bolshevik army was 
thrown back only at the gates of Warsaw. But there was no wcrld 
revolution. 
Meanwhile the^^Bolsheviks were busy reorganizing what ter-
rlj;Qry^-4;heyL.-alrBAdjriiad. For this task Marx provided only a 
v^y ii^omplete blueprjUit. He had analyzed nineteenth century 
socieTy Xn'soiSe aetair, but his predictions of what WQuld hap-
p^n when the proletarlat^seized. power were imprecise. The same 
was~True of TiPnin's writings up to L917. Lenin confidently 
considered himself to be the interpreter of~lgary. v/h"ose"~Soals 
he"T:S^'fiTied cpmpletjely w^ his own, Within the>»brQ3i^tni't-'.j'' 
line thus provided, heflex.lbly. He once wrote, "If 
you are not able to adapt yourself, if you arerj^lll^llaed.to 
Cr aw 1 1 n the mud on your belly, you are not a revolutlxtnary , bu t 
a c"Eatterbox-." 
In_19^ a new constitution was promuj^atss 1 .aji 
Soc 1 a 11 ST~T5dgryt^tr^Soy t RepubXXc "CKr s. F. S. R.') , which was 
^ p p n  t o  s t r e t c h  f r o m  L e n  1  n g r a d  e a s t w a r d  a c r o s s  E u r o p ' e l a i a  
and Siberia tothe pacific. land, forest and mineral re­
sources, factories, livestock, stores, banks, and communication 
facilities were declared to be the property of the state. Laboi!— 
was proclaimed tn bn tKo~l^TTtv^ Workers were guaran­
teed the right to education and to hold religious or atheistic 
opinion. Oppression of natlnnaT minorities waw fn-rhiriHan The 
.fraocliaae was granted 4;u-..t,hase..of., over-.~eigh,teen, whp,^ 
were woxkers- ox -members of the armed forees. Among the groups 
deprived of the franchise and the right to hold office were 
traders for private profit, former tsarist police, persons de­
riving income from sources other than their own labor, clergy­
men, and opponents of farm collectivization (and their children). 
Electoral districts wexe.^enerally,.based on occupation rather 
than geographical area. Voting was by show of hands and,"for 
thepyramid of soviets, indirect. The rural voter elected mem­
bers of his village soviet, which handled local matters. Vll-
lage soviets sent delegates to district soviets, and they i'n~" 
iEu^ to IcejrxonaJL ^avie±s7~ Town~and factory soviets, whose mem­
bers were considered more dependable, had a somewhat greater 
privilege of direct election. At the top of the pyramid was 
the All-Russlan Congress of Soviets, with membership heavily 
weighted to favor urban areas. 
In 1922. by which time a number of non-RussianJbprderlands 
had bgeiLxecap'tured,^ the lT"g. ^a-de a subdlyillan 
of ^ federal state.^...the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics 
(U. S. S. R.). Each of the constituent republics wasjglven ^ 
^ ' 
J 
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constitutioii-jaQ4e3re4---&H—tliat of the R. S. F. S. R. Acquisitions 
through 1940 brought their number to sixteen. Within the ex-
i-^lhg framework"W was capable oi further expansion. 
Absence of the word. "Russian'' from the title represented 
the claim that tsarist Russlflcation and other aspects ofbour-
geQlS--natXieHaXl^raT'"~had'*^een aban Much p^^^ 
was made of the assertion that the U. S. S. R. alone had suc­
ceeded in solving the modern problem of nationalism. Cultural 
a^pexit^._uxt.4aationali^m were .encouraged. Books were printed in 
the various tongues of the Union. "WEere, as in the case of 
many Asiatic peoples, no printed language existed, one was in­
vented. Local historical monuments were maintained. Perform­
ances of folk songs, folk dances, and other aspects of popular 
naj:i_Qna1 mil tuvA watp fostered. Political autonomy of the re­
publics was in practlcelljiniWd to administrative matters, and 
even there overall supervision was exercised from Moscow. In 
theory, any republic could secede from the Union^ but this right 
w as  mor e  t ha n  co u n t e r ba l anced  by  t he  de t e rmina t i on  t o  p p r m i t  n o  _  
r'^t^gressloa-±Q,_jcapitaX which secession was construed to be. 
Critics assert that even cultural autonomy was more appar­
ent than real. The official SOV1B±_ concept of federalism is 
"national 1ji form, £icui-ialijs±--lxL p.ontei^t -Certainly national 
cultures are heavily edited, Anti-Russian references are de­
leted from folk songs. Na11onal histories are not permitted to 
give inconvenient prominence to reriglon or to classes ^ under"" 
suspicion. Asfar and away the largest, the most safely Bol­
shevik, and one of the most advanced peoples of the Union, the. 
KAJfiSllLna„jdomina.ta.»±h!Q^ . The Russian lan:?ua.i-e is tai^-rht 
everywhere, along v^ith local tongues, and knowledge oi it has 
r e H p i ^ t i c a l  v a l u e .  M l g r ^ i o n s  o f  R u s s i a n  w o r k e r s  a n d  o f f i -
c 1 al^_Jia^e_xJlians§ non-RussTan-
areas. Yet with all its shortcomin^fs, the avowed "Soviet na^— 
^Tonalities policy has been a valuable tpnl fnr the regime. 
Without it territoriaT expansion might have been much more dif­
f i c u l t .  
The constitution of the U. S._S^ R. gave to the central 
government powers unusua,lly broad, for an avowedly federalT's^ate. 
In theory7~TPcrr^eTgn policy and trade, economic planning, defense, 
justice, education, and public health were the sole concern of 
the Union government. In practice, pr.mpp.-t-p»nno pf the Union , 
government was xinllwi-ted. It will be noted that here as in 
other branches of the regime no real-jdlstinction Is marip between 
executive. Ieglslatl3za..„ and ludlcAf^A Courts, 
for example, are instruments to carry out state policy, with no 
pretense to political impartiality. 
The new constitution placed a new body at the top of the 
hierarchy of sovleto! the Aii-UnionJaojigrjBBS_of_3oviets. This 
bo^ was too large and met too seldom to do more than listen to 
spooches and approve the work of the Union Central Executive 
Committee and the Union Council of Commissars. The Executive 
Committee had full powers to act for the Soviet between sessions 
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but here again a smaller body, the Presidium, tfindpiri tp aannwia 
direction cf its functions. The Execut:l:ve''Coimittee was also 
s\ipposed to supervise~tiri~'cabinet, the Council of Commissars 
(later renamed Council of Ministers). 
T^re is a certain amoiuit-lejtt-unsaid--about-the^^xejailltles 
of jp^gEltical^ife^Tn any constitution. This is particularly_ 
true of thfiL^viet constitiitioi^-^aljove all besmiae 
silence- about, the Communist party . In the organization ,AS_ 
forgedJby. Lenin, the word "party" was a historical accident,, 
apt to misieiad if considered analagous to pjartie^ iP- ^ democrAtic 
c^cTcmtries. The Communist party~Ti^~ ah o^rganizat 
with" advocation for leadership to a communist so9iS.ty« At 
Lenin^sdeath it was still a relatively small elite of about 
500,000. Most of the party magnates had worked and suffered 
together for years. jjo.jmAtter„ howJhiiih Jbheir pqs 
were supposed to receive the same wages as other workerai oif 
bj:!Arn and brawn. The faint-hearted, the morally slack, .and 
those who retained such "bourgeois" traits as religious belief 
were expelled. Lenin lljcened them to radishes, red nutfllrlfi hut 
v^ite-at~heart*- WltMn the party inner circle there was con­
siderable and often bitter debate, but once a decision had been 
reached, united action was required of all members. 
The~atructure of the party paralleled that of the state. 
Cemraunist youth organizations indoctrinated young peQMe_unt£I 
they were accepted by tlOie "cells" at the bottom of the pjkslx 
hierarchy. At the top was the party congress, whicTi in prac­
tice approved the work of its commiTtBe's; a Central Committee 
of about seventy members and a Commission of Party Control en­
trusted with maintenance of discipline among party members, In 
the Lenin period important decisions were made in the Central 
Committee but later it tended to fall under the influence of 
three smaller bodies, supposedly its agents; the secretariat, 
responsible for "the current work of organization and execution;" 
the organization bureau (Orgbureau), responsible for propaganda, 
promotion and demotion, and conditions of membership; and the 
political bureau (Politbureau), which determined general poli­
cies, Considerable duplication of membership knitted together 
these central bodies. 
At each level airollar duplication interlocked thfi^jBirty 
wltii thC~aSa5«-ai^ bodies. Party policies were 
thus fed into national life. Party approval was necessary for 
inclusion on the single slate of candidates permitted at elec­
tions, Another parties were outlawed. Other potestial-ral-
lyjjjjjlpointaof disaffection-Wflre_eitheiL.Jiarrowly circumscribed, 
as in the case of the Greek Orthodox church, or taken„jiveiu_by 
the state, as were the press and other means of communication. 
This was dlcta^torship by the party in the name of^the-jwrle-
tariatx-^ 
The economic policy first introduced by the new regime, 
and lasting until 1921, has been labeled war communism. At the 
commencement of Bolshevik rule, land, factories, and communica-
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tions were in the hands of peasants and workers who had, in 
Marx's phrase, "expropriated the expropriators." The party had 
encouraged this for tactical reasons, but once in power it pro­
ceeded to nationalize the means of production, distribution, and 
exchange. Producers v/ere required to hand over to the state 
what they did not need for their own consumption. To replace 
rnoney^whQS,S„.JU^e wa^ discjoaxaged.„a.a--a--^^ hangover, 
to allocate of aop.ial 
^iSility. Famili_lTgs:;p2«p^^e4^^^^^ capitalist feature, 
wfixe-^v^aSened by lejaiant-marxiag^ aB4~di,vox<S^^^^ Private 
1;radii;g^ w^s„fiu£l5we4..-as, .couixterrevolutionary By these and^ " 
Othsx-devices the regime sought- to. hustle Russxa into communism. 
The result was disastrous. nc^gc!+a + -i<-.p hy -FnT'o-i p-^ nind 
civil war was bad "epougii.. There were no reserves"©! ravF mate­
rials or replacements for parts or livestock. The naw RyPi-i-qm 
woygft. Peasants . went on .alalt^down atr ike ^ refua-_ 
insi;' to turn over i-hcn t» -J— .p„™ r:;
^ I LliiJJ iir. | •i.V-'* v^v 
-neecUi^ what they, y/anted was land~ folf" themselveg, not state"^' 
for their own 
supervision^ In their ighbrahce theyBad helievedthatall 
taxes and rents would vanish. The transportation system de­
teriorated further. Armed factory wnrkp-rR rnanr^'^l the fmin-i-vy-. 
^lae in search of food._ CommTttees of v/orkmen were unable to 
iiiana^e plants efficiently. Despite aid frora foreign relief 
' fanino stalked the land. Unrest culminated in 
sai 1 ors of Im.wim .. 
hxtiaerto . ardent,, .,i»uppDrters._ ,ol"Bbi3h§ylMa.,,, 
T|ie revolt was ci'usheribut it galvanized the party into 
some serious rethinking of tactics. An example of the bitter 
intraparty debate which ensued concerned the role cf the trade 
unions. Qne^group, ,-fearful of dir-ta.±rvyahip ^.y th^ pavty hii-
> insisted that the unions should.„contXQ,l economic 
mat I-E^S. At-the other ext-remc wert;!—those J—NG TrOtRky, 
wko--.igJLt—tlia.t.__thej?& was no need for trade unions in a woxkexs' 
state^ On this and other matters he carried the day" and a New 
E c o n o m i c  P o l i c y  ( 1 9 2 1 - 1 9 2 8 ) ,  u s u a l l y  a b b r e v i a t e d  a s  N .  E .  P . ,  
was proclaimed. 
. , • P « proposed--to build, , the-,5Qviet economy bv a 
judicious and temporary iSiection of a ^ny-
_ The commanding heights." Lenin*s phrase^S^TjEST 
?les, transport, and foreign tradi7~wer^^ be kejci:t^-iflr-
state ownership and expanded, but, pr-ivpindivTciuals wer 
mitted to open- small—factoriea. Concessions were granted 
xoreign capitalists.Private trading and a money economy were 
reintroduced. In the countryside, peas ant s_,jQLir-_xxaXectiv.§_J[ 
w^e allowed„tQ_ sell on the open market"anything produced over 
and~aBQve_..^atate Ievy7 Tt was -perartred^to^reintrbauBe"^!^^ 
farming, hire labor, and rent land. A new class of small ca 
italists aimeared. ^ 
Saa^ul was this_!^tempoi*aTy^^trRflt-'^"-rrom 
productj^on of most goods attained prewar levels. Simul-
tanemisTyTa corresponding sniit in lorelgn policy dampened 
ii 
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Soviet support of v/orld communism. 
By this time Lenin was no longer at the heli/. pis health 
broke gmyii. in~T922 an3'''^l the ljegjTrTrnig~or 1924 he died. There 
ensued a strViRKleJloF power among'TTie party leaders ^ of w^om^— 
^wo^ Trotsky and Stalin, stand out. On the surface, Trotsky 
heldl-tho-Aai^:^ cardst Although a latecomer to Bolshevism, he 
had stood close to Lenin, was a brilliant controversialist, andj 
as witnessed by his organization of the Red army, possessed ad­
ministrative talent of a high order. Possibly his p.hief weak­
ness Lax inJjis cgnaciousness of his own brilliance, which led 
him into incautious acts and statements. Ha suffered m"edioc^ 
and inclu4ed, Stalin in their number. 
Stalin_had never been intima with Lenin, but he~liadn5ieeir~a" 
useful and iraportant party wprlcer. Endowed wi-th^-an.- exc'e 
sense of timing, he succeeded in givl[^Lg~an~lmpression of rigor-
dxrs""B6lshevik ortjioB In l§22^e'"T}ecame party gener^T~sec-
retaryj, a post he used to build up a personal following in the 
party apparatus. Leninl^L,political testamentj knowu^ins^ Rus-
gia only in.„pariaL..cdxcle.a-^ - warneX.agaijaat_l3Qth~ Trotsky ' s mer-
CurfaT temperament and-Stalin,'s„.heavy hand. 
The_iiieoXcxg^iGal--coiiil±ct, between these two centered around 
two ma.ior tactical... questions^ which each man answered ap-, 
Jiealing to the..Jtorxist-Leifli]is t canon. The f i -rst i 
Soviet UniQiL!-S-.JiQsAtioHia—the .world. Stalin argued that, 
since^the collapse of capitalism was not imminent, "socialism 
in one country" should be constructed in Russia as a halfway 
house to communism. The Soviet Union would then be a showcase 
to the world proletariat, whom it would lead in due course to 
world communism. Tmtpsky arpufid^-thart the--weyl4--cQuld not exist 
part capitalist,, part socialist or communist. To attempt to 
create socialism in one country, especially in a relatively un-
industrialized country like Russia, would lead inevitably to 
bureaucratic dictatorship. nonimiini^tm--emi 1 -through^ 
"pexiaaaettt--revol'utiT5Tian.^ immediate^ aj^d., £ of 
rej?.olxitAo»--i&ta industrialized countries and thence throughout 
the world. 
Relevant here is the other major ideological bone of con­
tention, the relative importance of industrial workers and 
peasants, T^£Gisky_J2£lie.yed that only industrial workerS-,^y 
virtue of the coop^eratiye conditions, pj thelr^work^ were cap-
aOT^of cp^ MarXism at..this. POint.. There'f6f e",'~ sintje" 
tiiey alone could develop a revolutionary consciousness, they 
should be favored over the peasantry. Consequently^,^ industri­
alization must be pushed at the expense of agriculture. 3talin_, 
argued that aij. imiaediate increase in agricultural production 
was essential and thaji_jtherefore temporary concessions must, be 
made to the peasants, especially to their addiction to Indivld-
Later, under different circumstances, ^Stalin-xild 
these and other contentions!-4>j&-TretskvL^but for the tim . ing 
he .succeeded in getting them condemned as heretical. Usihgjhis 
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control of the pflj:^ty~-machiiie^-_hjg_pl ay ed o f f Trotsky and other 
, Trotsky committed tactical errors, 
above all when he violated party discipline by appealing over 
the heads of the central committee to the rank and file. One, 
by one Stalin's oppojiejit3.-jgeg.e--dfiiap-ted^ „QX-expelled from th^ 
party •or forced abjectly to recant ,thei.r^-^ Trotsky, ac­
cused of"factionalism.," a heinous party sin, was eveiiTulSTly 
exiled abroad in 1929. He continued his agitation from afar 
until 1940, when he was_assa§sina^ in Mexico bv a Stalinist 
a^ent. Between 1929 and 1931 the ax fell on the so-called 
Right Opposition whom Stalin accused of going too far in advo­
cating independence for trade unions and concessions to the 
peasantry. 
By then the economic policy of the Union had entered an 
important new phase. Stalinasserted that the capitalist ele-
r>f thp» N T'' P, hppiTnni rII t!ievwer^ worth" 
'It was now time to so manipulate social forces as to advance 
further toward socialism. The initial step in this "new social­
ist offensive" was the First'•F'lve max Plan (1928-1932'). Nepmen 
and other temporary concessions to capitalism were abolished. 
Subsequent plans followed, not always on schedule. The sixth 
began in 1956. In all of them wnyrta were collectiviza-
t.i nr» anri ;i nrinsitrl fl 1 i 
It was the avowed intention of the 
Soviet Uni6nTr]rt?r''an"TndustriaTiz*e3'"*^^ 
'S to turja^j^ 
In the"first-plan 
(EeCTlreia"completed in four years') 
more than doubled.. Capital goods received the greatest empTiasis. 
•^^.antomania^' seized the planners, who insisted on the biggest 
dams, the largest factories, the tallest skyscrapers. Later 
plans abandoned this for more economical concepts. Later plans 
also claimed to place more emphasis on quality than on quantity, 
and on consumer goods, although troubled international relations 
in the 1930's meant priority to defense industries. OificiaJ. 
Soviet statistics showing a 650 per cent increase in gross in-
Wstriil.. output be'tween" a'nd' 1840 are exa^eratloji5,"1&ut_^he 
•JI'. S. S. R. would hot' be todas:..,l^g^world's second jjadu 
power unless they contained a large element of truth. —— 
All this qn immense effort from the Russian people, 
In the intertJBL ol' incre^ed j^oductivity in tTie long ruh"~fliey 
were told to tighten their belts and work harder. A more rigid 
factory discipline was enforced. Piecework pay andother forms 
of wage incentives were introduced^under the^^inciple "from 
eac!r~accoraitig tu hiH"~gtriTri%(Ss e^h accordtirgjEoIt^ 
he produces." FropagarTda was mobilized to ma^e_,jLip..for the lack 
of goodaV " Shock"Troop^of dedicated Commun-
isTsTw^e thrown into key positions in the "battle for steel" 
and other products. AxiisJLs and writers were ordered to follow 
the canons of "socialist realism" ^y inp- aj't which would 
^arry a Commun:\st in a form comprehensible to the masses, 
^t.akhamwltepi/' work£>ys who had .surpass.e.d_J:.hei V -prnxtoe^on 
quotas, were honored as Heroes of Socialiat_-I.abor. Where propa-
ganda failed, the police Took oyer with their slave labor camps. 
A 
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J/hile industrialization wa^ aroducing giant factories an^a 
ne^ citigg,. F tJoere..QWce had been empty stepnfis~""a1T5~1^^ 
"^dreat-s.:^^ rural collectl_vijzat»L3ja.~AKaiCx:aai£LLng-^^ in "thF> 
^.coixatry&ide- i»-tlie . IgSQi^. The regime needed more food~'ToF~TSe 
growing cities and for export than small private farmers could 
produce. Kulaks were now relep-ated tn _the ashcan of history. 
" 1 iquidated as a class.." Ttxev were ordered to merge their land, 
ecjtTTpinent, and livestock with that of poor peasants tQ,.^,^rm col­
lective farms. There each household was to have for its 
uge~"F"^^fellinr!; an^d^aTtiny garde£:pl:o all other land being 
faxined".ioin11 y. Its income would come from garden vegetables 
and from a share in the profits of the collective after meeting 
all expenses, including the required deliveries to the state. 
This share was based too on the amount and quality of labor per­
formed. Along with collectivization went a drive to introduce 
machinery and improved agricultural techniques. 
The kulaks and others met collectivization with the age-
old weapons of the peasant, passive resistance and violence. 
Fields stood untilled. Cattle and equipment. ivprp> tn 
keep them out of the hands n| the gtaJin. ,jl 
^re attacked;. gnvfirnin^nt I i ^  wj| th.„ propaganda,;, feoae-
fWy inducements, and forced In the Ukraine, where agrarian 
ionalism, the state deliberately unrest was combined with nat ; 
permitted a famine to run its course in order to starve resist­
ance . Iv^i 11 ions were deported to siavQ^ labar~camp.s • 
la-nds inl£M.,..east. Poor peasants WQXQ,JLacii^ed..jLgainst 
more prospjerous^^^^^^^ The government achieved its goal, at 
tlie cost of immense suffering and a temporary set-back in agri­
cultural production. By__1933_,__about_tEti=±hixds—of—the—pjeaaast 
households. cultivating about eighty-five per cent of the arable 
land, belonged to collective farma. 
For an assessment of the early plans as a whole only a few 
general observations can be made here. That productivity, 
Qatiofl,.—aad..urbanijzatiQn took great .^,iJiLdes^i^..,indubl.talile. 
That many found opportunities for more profitable....a^i4a^-^ai:ex^ 
esting work, and that many too were exhj i t^ri hy tnhari rt" i n a 
achievement j is equaDLy trueT T^e cost wa^?^i p:n ltd.gh. 
For many if~nieant dfOTg^fy7™^i"vaTl^^n,^"anci a bre^ with an ac­
customed way cf life. For others it meant starvation or forced 
labor. FO£ alJL-jLt meant obedience to orders from above. Few 
other countries so compietely transformed tEe'Tl'"''"^"olnoniy in a 
generation. One was nineteenth century Japan. She did it v;ith-
out Communism, with fewer natural resources, and with no legacy 
of industrial pioneering from preceding generations. Just what 
Russia could have accomplished under other regimes is a tanta­
lizing question. 
Certainly jthe _^yiet , regime during the PLANG PF ]Q:^Q-L« 
feecame^ increasirir;Tv f jp-i d . What. Ahe party decided was best foy 
the people they must do. wiliingly if possJible, if not, then 
under duress. Purges~~Sesigned to secure that automatic obedi­
ence deemed necessary for success rocked Soviet society to its 
roots, trials, 
XVIII p. 45 
^0£S-j—lachnicians .__aDjd---WOyl4--f-aBKauS^- nommrmi satp; wprp- r-r>nf^P»rin^H 
^  death aftex.„xioi^ sabotage_j^nd treason, including 
involvement in fantastic conspiracies with Xaz^&^ZIIiLpari^^ ,  
Tru Itbikv 1 Ifes r~ijad„xiaoi.tAlists.  Others who presumably w6ul' '3~TQot 
confess simply disappeared. After the revnlntinn had dpynnrtari 
cbildren-r"St-arl-i^-jffaa^^--y4jP^vtalXy---Jj3e only old Bolshevik left.  
TSTTor did not stop there. Feeding on i tself,  on rumor, on 
suspicion, on grudges, i t  spread in ever-widening circles. No 
one, no matter how great or how insignificant, was safe. One 
source estimates that five per cent of the population (about 
8,000,000 people) passed through the pretrial prisons of the 
secret police between 1936 and 1938. 
By the latler-jear. all  rritjr ' iKm of was stifled 
and._cortain interestdng„-txjends-. wja.T-c^—nhiaPT-yahi -j p <ar^v;i,p•{; ±_ 
etJU The higher ranks of party and state were filled increas­
ingly j not from the working classes, but from the ranks of the 
new educated class of managers and technicians, Intel 1 er.tiial H ^ 
against whom Stalin seems to have held a particular grudge, 
were suspect and their activities circumscribed.^^^^ W unions 
became mere government bureaus to increase production. History 
wa^B r<^written f,Q iinrlm-1 i  Stalin's IntimaCY V/ith T.enin. his 
infa_lJJJbllity. ajid the unimportance of his earlier rivals. To 
bolster the now fasliionaBle tEeory of "democratic centralism," 
Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great,  and other outstanding lead­
ers from Russia's past v/ere rehabilitated. Patriot-j , nrt 1"°t 
loyajJ:y to a class, finr.e-again fostered, ijivoixe laws were 
t t h e  f a r a i 4y--.x£Liael:Ked„~mQre_,pmp]ha„i&is. In, the army, 
saluting, distinctions in rank, and other disciplines and tradi­
tions ^re reintroducgd. Qecorations and financial rewards v/er^ 
given •tonmen'ngJlTInauishinp?^h6mselve3 inllG^ful fxeTffs of ac­
tivity. """" —— — 
Like the restoration of certain features of pre-Scviet 
society, tlig new constitu±lim-..xxL..„19J3£....:aLai3. an...£jfort tc 
balance." terror. .MoreoveE,,_i,l , j3rovided good oropj-^sinda at a 
jJLma-jsdasii^the re^ii e,  alarmed af ' the Tfse"*6T*7!ragayft_.ajid Nazi 
form a comi.icn^ i£ai2C13]£E. 
... The new constitution made certain modifications in the 
structure of the central government, but i ts most significant 
changes were those purporting to increase popular participation 
in the regime. The goviet Uiidjon waa—al int 
s.ta±s-..of...work-er  ^ and peasants;'L .offi clal ly, s.acl.aIJ.£iEL->v.sia an.. 
accompjL 1 sJied..fact.  The forms of mass participation in govern­
ment'" were emphasized. There was a code of rights: to work, 
leisure, education, unite in public organizations, speak freely, 
and so forth. Equality of rights .without reo-ard to race or 
na±jLoBallty.jas„.gmKS»tBe37~32iere was algg a l ist  of civic 
duties, such as work, military service, and protection of so.-
cialis.t  property. Voting w^^j npen,^jfco >n pot Ht^pri 
franchise by court order. .  The secret.ballot and-territorial 
constituencies jwgKerrntroduce^ Elections were made_ direct.  
Jhe predpniinanc§„ of. was reduced. AltHougli the new 
constitution may well have encouraged many Soviet citizens to 
feel closer to the regime, i t  specifically reaffirmed the 
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monopoly position of the Communist party. Indeed, during the 
1930's the party further tightened its hold on the state, while 
Stalin's machine more narrowly regimented the party. 
There has been some discussion whether Lenin would h^e 
approfeT"or;th^^^^^ Lenin had„.x,ecognize4 
cerfcaXa.-j^ moer-atlc^ prms in party and state, 
but he had no confidence in the political capacity 6f"T;l^ ^^ "m . 
'Tliey^ were to "be induced to lend their weight in support of~tBe 
party, but they were not to participate in decision making. 
Democratic forms were to be counterbalanced by totalitarian con­
trols. Decisions were made in the Central Committee in v/hich 
he had played the role of only first among equals. Yet he un-
«iQ^ M.edly had crea4i^ d..a refi-ime that was to ,mals;a..At&lin^ s jjer-
pQnaJL-dxctatorship possible. 
The drive to industrialize, the purges,, and the so-called 
St€ilin~constitution were all related to xncreaslng tension»J.<n 
international relations in the 193P's_. In 1941, Germany invaded 
tlre'Tri R. , precipitating what the Soviets call the Great 
Patriotic War or the Second Great Fatherland War. Soviet-.pTT>pa-, 
ganda put renewed emphasis on such patriotic themes as the de-
^eat~ of Napoleon's invasion in 1812, the First Great Fatherland 
War. It dgpiQted Pv.uaaia...-aa>..a^ .momboaf^ f a comiiiQii._.demoGrAt.lc.. 
f^njt_^against tyranny. The party eased its admissions stand­
ards .~~~,Troe"0^ church receivexi—1 imi tftd—af^amval as a reward 
for its patrio¥is^ :i^H'"~oTaTiii"assumed directiQR oJE the war ef-
loFt7"moreand more was heard about ..JLth leader." 
These and other propaganda themes helped steel the Soviet 
people for the grueling demands of war. Roughly one-third qf 
the male gopulationptwoj:'king age joined "THe^med forces. 
European Russia was a battIefieia,"Where "some^^ 6^^ 
Union's richest agricultural land and much of its industrial 
plant were destroyed. 
Wasx-aliiQ, reLvealed tJaat popular support of the regime was 
not uTiiver.aal. Particularly in non-Russian territories, the^ 
Germajj „axiaieg„jyexa„Q,ften greeted as libe'ratoi^ They even ~ 
raised a small anti-Soviet army in the TnvaHed areas. 
nature of tills axiti—Soviet feellng.was .vaxi^ : anti-Russian 
natiojiial-ianjJ opposition to collectivization, opportunism, and 
eoramunist criticism of Soviet-burea«<i»a'ey E6we^ f7~^ |)flQe''ln 
Soviet victories and the incredible brutality of the Nazi occu­
pation forces soon deprived the invaders of most local support. 
V i - 4 ^ ^  t h e L - a a v x a t — x aglme and-ljtia__subiects 
filled with a new-s©i^„coafidence. They had come through a 
terrible ordeal together. They had reconquered most of the 
territory lost in 1918, plus other lands. Soviet. Ixiflueace. was 
do.minaigLt in Europe and rising In AsXa.«^ Thanks tp akm-
ful propagandar -the people, k^^e^ little, of the sacrifices and 
ContTibutions of Russia's allies. Stalin hastened to warn the 
citizens that they would have to tighten their belts during a 
long period of reconstruction . Wartime relaxation of certain 
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aspects of party and state was abandoned, gx-servicemen who 
had seen capitalist Europe ,jyere .carefulXy,-watched by the polxc©-,-
Tl^^en, in 1953, Stalin.died..,>,.leav.ing no obyious successor. 
To protect" the" regime in this crisis, the party magnates closed* 
ranks and presented a united front to the outside world. Stalin, 
w^s condemned., pos-thumously for encouraging a non-Marxist" cult 
of personality." In its place the regime prapoiuid^d.,the...thjecrit 
of 2•" There was a mild "thaw" in the 
niD'noTithic coritroi of life, permitting more independence than 
hitherto. The extent to which growth of a managerial class made 
this essential is much debated this side of the "iron curtain." 
Meanwhile7—In tjheJLn^ circle^ thejiagnates jockeyed_,£Qr 
position. _ Sdrn^ were purged, aLthough ,theX£.JKa^'-ndI"^ pu^e 
comparaBXi- tOL..thaT of the 1930's. At the time of this writhing, 
the star of Nikita Khrushchev (1894- ) v/as clearly in the 
ascendancy. There were no signs that the party was as yet per-
"THi^deS^ that the people were prepared to do voluntarily what the 
party thought they should do, that, in other words, the state 
might wither av/ay. 
To illustrate more fully some aspects of the ideology and 
practice of the Soviet system, two documents are presented—be­
low . one—narrQwly---.palxtijca 1, tjie other tniTFThiin th<a 
non-Communist.World„would be_C^^^^ of only remote political 
interest. Here the reader can find materlaT relevant to the~~"-«^ 
westion posed earlier; in.^what proportions is the Soviet re- ^ 
y^me Marxist, orRussian^-or-totalitarian? The first document 
"'consists of selections from a speech on the Soviet constitution > 
delivered by Stalin to the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of 
Soviets in 1936: 
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